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IN THE SUPREMF. cnuRT nF 'l'.'HE S'r.~TE OF' tJTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. lRlAO

WENDELL IRVI nr, HI r... L,

T>efendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF

STATEMENT OF THE

RESPOTIDENT

N.~'rTlPE

OF THF.

CASE

Appellant was chargen with one count of Agqravated
Burglary in violation of Utah Code Ann.,

~

76-6-2n3 ( 1978),

one count of Aggravated Robbery in violation of Utah Code
Ann.,~

76-~-302

Utah Code Ann.,

(lq7R), one count of Theft in violation of
~

76-~-404

(19~8),

one count of Aggravaten

Assault in violation of Utah Code Ann.,

~ 76-5-103

( 1978), and

a secona count of Aggravated Assault which was dismissed prior
to the trial.
nISP()S!TIOl'1 IN TflF, LOW:RR COTTRT

Appellant was tried before a jury and was found
guilty of one count each of Aggravatea Burglary, Agqravated
Robbery, ~heft, and Aggravated Assault on December 2 and 3,
1981 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of TJtah, the Honorable Christine M. nurham
presiding.

on December l~, 1~81, the trial court sentenced

appellant to two indeterminate terMs of not less than five
years which may be for life, one indeterminate term of not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

less than one year nor more than fifteen years and one
indeterminate term not to exceed five years, the sentences to
run concurrently.
RELIEF SOTJf;PT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks a judgment and order of this Court
affirming the jury verdict and sentence of the lower court.
STATEMF,NT OF FAC!'S

Late in the evening of nctober ;, lq81, or the early
morning of October 8, 19Rl, Richard Salamone, manager of the
Stratford Hotel, and John Savage, his guest, were watching
. television in the office of Salarnone's apartment in the hotel
(T. 41,

4~).

Salamone's living quarters were in noom

2n~

of

the Stratford Rotel, connected to the anjoining manager's
office in Room 201 by an open doorway (T. 18, 40).

Both of

the adjoining rooms had doors that opened to the hotel's
hallway (T. 41).
As Mr. Salamone went into the kitchen in Room 202 to
get a piece of pie, there was a knock on or shaking of the
door to Room 201 ( T. 41, 47, 108).

Mr. Salamone opened the

door to Room 202 and saw two rnen--appellant, Wendell Irving
Hill, and Paul Miller (T. 44).

Appellant and Miller forced

their way into the apartment and appellant struck Mr. Salamone
(T. 45, 46, 64, 9;, lnQ).

and Mr. Savage with a

Appellant threatened Mr. Salamone

"r~rman

that he was going to kill him

Ruger" and told Mr. Salamone
(~.

47,

~l,

5S,

6~,

R9-90,

I

99-lOf').
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant asken Mr. Ralamone where the hotel's money
was kept CT. 4q).
201 (T. 4Q).

Mr. Salamone pointed to the aesk in Room

Appellant and Miller took about

drawer of the desk (T. 50-Sl,

8~,

101).

~SO

from the

Later, appellant went

through the drawer again ana found more Monev, approximately
$20, which he took (T. 56).

~he

two men also took a portable

color-.. television, a clock radio, a short-wave raaio, a
cassette recorder and a pillowcase from Mr. Ralamone's
apartment (T.

59-~0).

nuring the incident, Miller bouna Mr. Salamone ana
Mr. Savage with nylon stockinqs and gag gen them \Ti th washrags
(T. 54-55, R5, 101).

Appellant repeatenly threatened to kill

Mr. Salamone and Mr. Savaqe (T. 51,

55-5~,

9q, 104, 10"7).

Appellant and Miller fled the scene in a Cadillac,
but were apprehended approximately two and one-half blocks to
three blocks from the Stratford Hotel (T.
117).

~;,

fi?.,

104, 113,

The stolen television set was found in the front seat

of the Cadillac and the other items taken from Mr. Salamone's
apartment were found in the trunk of the car (T. 62, llq,
137-130).

Seventeen dollars in one-dollar bills was founa

scatterea in the trunk of the car (T. 140, 147).

The gun with

which appellant threatened Mr. Salamone and Mr. Savage fell
out of the car onto the street when one of the apprehending
officers opened the door to the front passenger seat of the
car where appellant was sitting (T. 119-12P, 123,

14~-147).

-3-
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Appellant was charqed with Aggravated Burglary,
Aggravated Robbery, Theft and two counts of Aggravated Assault
( T. 13-14) •

At trial, appellant successfully argued that an
Aggravated Assault charge relating to Mr. Salamone should be
dismissed because that crime was a lesser included offense of
the crime of Aggravatea Robbery of Mr. SalaMone, as alleged in
Count II of the Information.
Appellant al so contend ea that because Theft, chargea
in Count III of the Information, was a lesser included offense
of Aggravated Robbery, charged in Count II of the Information,
Count III of the Information should be dismissed.

The court

denied appellant's motion and founn that the offenses of Theft
and Aggravated Robbery, as charqed in the Information, were
separate offenses ( T. 1Cl9).
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court
erren in failing to find as a matter of law that theft is a
lesser included offense of aggravatea robbery.

Appellant does

not challenge his convictions on other counts.
ARGTJMRNT
POINT I
THEFT IS NOT A. LESSB:R
A<'~r.RAVATEn

INCLTTnFn OFFENSF. OF

ROB RP.RY.

The question presented in this appeal is whether the
crime of theft is a lesser included offense of the crime of
-4-
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aggravated robbery.

The standard for determining when an

offense is a lesser includeo offense of another is
Utah Code Ann.,

~

76-1-402(3)

(195~),

codifie~

in

as amended, which

provides:
(3) A nefendant may be convicted of an
offense inclu~ea in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense
charged: or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or forM of
preparation to commit the offense cha_rged
or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
(c) It is specifically designated by
statute as a lesser included offense.

In State v. Brennan, 13 ntah 2d lqs, 371

P.

2d 27,

2~

( lqn2)

this Court set forth the requirements of an included offense
as follows:
The rule as to when one offense is
included in another is that the greater
offense includes a lesser one when
establishment of the greater would
necessarily include proof of all the
elements necesary to prove the lesser.
Conversely, it is only when proof of the
lesser offense requires some element not
involven in the greater offense that the
lesser would not be an included offense
[Footnote omittedl.
See also:

State v. Cross, Utah,

64~

P.2d i2

(lC\~2);

State v.

Elliott, TJtah, fi41 P.2a 12?. (l<l8?.): State v. Williams, Utah,
-~-
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f'16 P.2d 1092 (19Bl); State v. Laine, Utah, 61R P.2d

(1980); State v. r,andee, Utah, 587 P.2d

10~4

Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 13 P.::>.d fi40 ( 1934).

:n

(1978); State v.

The determination of

whether the lesser offense of theft is included within the
offense of aggravated robbery requires an examination of the
respective elements of those offenses.
The jury was instructed that the statutory elements
of aggravaten robbery, Utah Code

Ann.,~

76-~-30?.

(1951), as

amenaea, were:
INSTRUC'l"J:ON NO. lR ( T.

7Q)

The defendant is chargerl by r.ount I I of
the Information in this case with a
violation of the statute which provides,
in part pertinent to this case, as
follows:
" • • • a person commits Aggravated Robbery
if in the course of committing robbery, he
• • • uses a firearm or facsiMile of a
firearm • • • or a deaaly weapon • • • "

*

*

*

" •• for the purpose of this Part, an
act shall be deemed to be in the course of
committing a robbery if it occurs in an
attempt to coMmit, during the commission
of, or the immediate flight after the
at tempt or commission of a robberv"
(Emphasis added).
-·
See also:

Jury Instruction No.

~l

(T. 92).

The jury was

instructed that the statutory elements of robbery, Utah Code
Ann.,~

7~-fi-301

(1~53),

as amended, were:

INSTRUCTION Nf'. 20 ( T. Al)
The elements of Robbery, as they relate to
this case, are;
-6-
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1. The taking of personal property from
another person; and
·
2. The possession or immediate presence
of such other person of said property; and
3. The taking of such property against
the will of such other person; and
4. The accomplishment of such taking by
such means of force and fear; and
5. Such taking being then and there
unlawful;
~.
Such taking beinq then and there
intentioned.
·
See also:

Jury In$truction No. lq (T. Rn).

The jury was

instructen that the statutory eleJT1ents of theft, Utah Code
Ann.,

~

76-6-404 (lqS3), as amended, were:

INSTRUCTION !'10. 23

(~.

84)

The defendant is charged hy Count III of
the Information in this case with a
violation of a statute which provides, in
part pertinent to this case, as follows:
"A person commits theft if he ohtains or
exercises unlawful control over the
property of another with the purpose to
deprive him thereof" (Emphasis added).
See also:

Jury Instruction No. 3? (T. 93).

Jury Instruction

No. 25 (T. 86) defined "purpose to deprive":

...
The same statute defines "purpose to
deprive" to mean • • • "to have the
conscious obiect:
[eitherl to withhold
property per~anently or for so extended a
period • • • that a substantial portion of
its economic value, or of the use ana
benefit thereof, would be lost; or to
dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that
the owner will recover it" [Brackets in
original; emphasis added].
-7-
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The elements requirea for proof of aggravated
robbery that are not requirea for proof of theft are, first,
that the person was "in the course of committing robbery,"

s

76-6-302(l)(a): and second, that the taking is accomplishen

by means of force or fear,

~

76-6-301(1).

The elements required for proof of theft that are
not

r~quiren

for proof of aggravated robbery are less easily

ascertained at first qlance.

Although confusing, the

transcript does provide some insight into the trial court's
basis for holding that theft requires an eleMent additional to
those that are required for aggravated robbery.

The State's

position at trial was that the element of "obtain[ing]
control • • • with the purpose to deprive"

(~

•••

7~-6-404)

was an

essential element of theft, State v. Laine, supra, at 15Q,
but not an essential element of aggravated robbery, Rtate In
the Interest of R.G.R., TJtah, 597 P.2d 1333, 1335 (197'l).
trial court recognizen that the additional

ele~ent

The

in theft

that is not an element of aggravateo robbery is the obtaining
control with the purpose to deprive (T. ?.6, ?.9, 192).
The "purpose to deprive" required by the theft
statute is a more specific kind of intent which goes beyond
that required for aggravated robbery.
is required

by~

An "intentional taking"

76-6-301, the robbery statute.

"Intentionally" is defined in Utah Code

Ann.,~

76-2-103(1)

-8-
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( 1953), as amend en, as:
person engages in conouct:

A

(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
wilfully with respect to the nature of his
connuct or to a result of his conduct,
when it is his conscious ohiective or
desire to enqage in the conduct or cause
the result.

See also:

Jury Instruction

~o.

2q (T.

~9).

Theft, however,

requires that the taking he with the "purpose to deprive,"
which is defined in Utah Code

Ann.,~

76-fi-401(3)

(1953), as

amerrl ed, as:
(e) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or
for so extended a period or to use under
such circumstances that a substantial
portion of its economic value, or of the
use and benefit thereof, would be lost: or
Ch) To restore the properly only upon
payment of a reward or other compensation
[this subsection was not included in the
Jury Instructions in this case] : or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that
the owner will recover it.
See also:

Jury Instruction No. 25 at p. 7 above.

The

"purpose to deprive" is a culpahle mental state required as an
essential element of the crime of theft which is by definition
more specific than the intentional, knowing or reckless mental
state generally required by the Criminal Code.
Laine, supra.

State v.

It is an element of theft which is required in
-9-
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addition to proof that the person acted intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly (See Jury Instruction No. 32, T. Q3).
The "purpose to deprive" is not, however, an element of
aggravated robbery, and it is not "embraced within the legal
definition thereof."
(1976).

State v. Sunter, Utah, 550 P.2d 184, l8S

Thus, theft cannot be a lesser included offense of

robbery.
The trial court noted an additional distinction
which is pertinent to th is case :
THE COURT:
• • • [Tl he court finds that
the offenses of theft and aqgravaterl
robbery are separate of fen~es as defined
by the legislature in the statutes of the
State of TJtah. And I want to make it
clear that I am being asked to find that
theft is a lesser included not of robbery,
but of agqravated robbery, because I think
that is an important distinction (T. 199).
The distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery
referred to in the foregoing excerpt takes its importance from
the fact that an intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of another need not be provea for aggravated
robbery (see the trial court's comments at T.
through T. 196, line 1).
~

lq~,

line 27

This is because, for the purposes of

76-6-302, the completed act of robbery is not required: an

a tternpt to commit robbery is sufficient.

Section 76-6-302

states in pertinent part:

-in-
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(1) A person commits aqgravatea robbery if
in the course of committing a robbery, he:

...

(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission
of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of the robbery
(Emphasis addea).
Under Utah Code Ann.,

~

76-4-101(1) (1953), as amended, a

person is guilty of an attempt if:
• • • [Alcting with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the commission of
the offense , he eng aqes in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward
commission of the offense •
. Thus, while an "unlawful and intentional taking • • . " is
required for robbery, under the attempt theory provided in the
aggravated robbery statute, no actual taking of property need
be proven to make out aqgravate~ robhery. Theft does require a
taking, specifically that the person "obtain or exercise
control

• with the purpose to deprive," and therefore

requires an element which is not requirea for agqravated
robbery when aggravated robbery is proved through the use of
the attempt theory.

The result is that theft is not

necessarily and always a lesser included offense of aggravated
robbery.

In State v. Williams, supra, at 1()96, (1981), this

Court adoptea the following lanquage from People v. Escarcega,
43 Cal. App. 391, 117 Cal. Rptr. c;gs ( 1Cl74):
-11-
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It is of no consequence that the evidence
at trial might also establish guilt of
another and lesser crime than that
charged. As indicated, to constitute a
"lesser and necessaril~ included offense"
it must be of such a nature that as a
matter of law and considered in the
abstract, the greater criMe as defineo by
statute or charged in the accusatory
pleading "cannot be committed without
necessarily committing [such otherl
offense." This rule has heen constantly
reiterated. • • • The lesser offense must
"necessarily and at all times [be]
included wiihin another one." • • • "If,
in the commission of acts Made unlawful by
one statute, the offender must always
violate another, the one offense [i.e.,
the latter] is necessarily included in the
other" [Citations omitted; emphasis and
bracketed language in original].
See also:

State v. Gandee, supra.

Because it is possible to

commit aggravated robbery without also committing theft, theft
is not a lesser includen offense of aqgravated robbery.

Thus,

appellant was properly charged and convicted of both theft ana
aggravated robbery.
POINT II
Ar.GRAVATED ASSATJLT IS NOT A LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF' AGGRAVATF:D ROBRERY AS
THOSE CRIMES WF:RE C:R..ARGEn IN THIS CASE.

Appellant makes the statement on page 10 of his
brief that:

-12-
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• • • the charqe of the lesser includea
offense of agqravated assault should have
been dropped and only the aqgr ava ted
robbery charge should have been pursued.
If this is an argument additional to his contention that theft
is a lesser included offense of aqgravated robbery, the

argument fails because appellant was charged and convicted of
the aggravated robhery of Richard SalaMone, hut was charged
and convicted of the aggravated assault of a different victim,
John

w. Savage.

Counts II and IV of Jury Instruction No. 1

verify this (T. 63-64).

Because the counts pertain to

different victims, neither crime alleged therein can be a
lesser included offense of the other.
CONCLUSI0N

Rased upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the conviction of the lower
court.
Respectfully submitted this

~ day of

March,

1983.
DA'7!D L. WILKINSON

A;;;;::t.l~
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General

-13-
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CERTIFICATR OF MAILINn
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Brooke

c.

Wells, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Assoc., 333 south 2no Rast, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this

Jl) day of March, 1981.
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